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Recent research has suggested that in the contemporary globalized and digitized 
world memories transcend national boundaries in a manner that might replace 
exclusive and antagonistic national histories with inclusive cosmopolitan solidari-
ties. This article critically engages with such models by exploring transcultural 
cross-referencing in narratives about Greek-Turkish relationships in two different 
settings: print media produced by memory activists from the expatriated Greek 
minority of Turkey; and peer-to-peer debates in the “comments” section on 
YouTube. Whilst such transcultural discourses might indeed draw different victim 
communities closer together, they nevertheless also have the capacity to reinforce 
national histories and identities.
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The Armenian genocide found its imitator in the person of Hitler who 
followed the Turkish example with the genocide of the Jews during the 
Second World War. Another genocide was committed by the Turks against 
the Cypriot people, and by the very same human rights have been fla-
grantly violated in Cyprus, Constantinople, Imbros, [and] in Anatolia 
against the Kurds.1 
In his posthumous volume The Collective Memory, the French sociologist 
Maurice Halbwachs wrote that “[e]very collective memory requires the 
support of a group delimited in space and time.”2 His notion that there is 
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a direct correlation between the vitality of a particular collective memory 
and the persistence of a specific, coherent group has underpinned much 
subsequent thought in the field of social memory studies. Yet if we take for 
granted that every memory depends upon the active support of a particular 
group, how can we account for the content of the extract cited above, 
in which an effort by an expatriated Greek from Istanbul to articulate a 
memory of their own community’s persecution in Turkey simultaneously 
accommodates and sustains the memories of other communities? Do such 
discourses demonstrate that the “container of the nation-state” as the 
principal repository of memory is “in the process of slowly being cracked”3 
and that memories might be adopted and kept alive by “others,” or is the 
persistence of an exclusive national outlook lurking beneath this overtly 
transnational language?
In this article, I explore the use of transcultural cross-referencing 
in Greek historical narratives about Greek-Turkish relationships. The 
article derives from two research projects, the first dealing with the expe-
riences and memories of the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros 
(Gökçeada) now resident in Greece, and the second investigating the 
construction, negotiation and contestation of the history of the Otto-
man Empire by Armenian, Greek, Kurdish and Turkish Internet users. 
I therefore focus on two sets of data produced by two (rather different) 
groups of “memory activists”: representatives of the expatriated Greeks of 
Turkey writing formally in newspapers and publicity materials, and (primar-
ily Greek) Internet users engaging in informal debates through YouTube 
comments. In both contexts, narrators offering antagonistic accounts of 
Greek-Turkish relationships have frequent recourse to comparisons and 
analogies drawn from the histories of other communities, notably Tur-
key’s Armenian, Assyrian and Kurdish communities and Europe’s Jews. 
Such mnemonic cross-fertilization confirms the argument advanced in 
recent literature that representations of the past are commonly articu-
lated within a transcultural field of reference, and that different histories 
of suffering need not necessarily be locked in a competition for primacy.4 
Indeed, my discussion lends credence to the suggestion that transcultural 
cross-referencing might lead to the elaboration of solidarities between 
different victim communities or even lay the groundwork for reconcilia-
tion between historical antagonists. I also seek to demonstrate, however, 
that memory’s extraterritorial journeys do not always or necessarily have 
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“cosmopolitan”5 or even “postnational” implications, and may frequently 
consolidate rather than undermine national identities and antagonisms. I 
suggest, moreover, that scholarship on transcultural memory would benefit 
from more explicitly recognizing the variable strength and depth of the 
“knotting” that connects different histories, which may have implications 
for our understanding of how transcultural memory is experienced by 
individuals on local levels, and how it finds meaningful expression in their 
narratives and understandings of the past.6 
THE TRANSCULTURAL TURN IN MEMORY STUDIES
In recent years, there has been a “transcultural turn” in the field of memory 
studies, developed by scholars who felt that earlier work was circumscribed 
by a “methodological nationalism” that took for granted a close link between 
a given collective memory and a particular national or ethnic group.7 These 
interventions have come from several disciplines, but have been driven 
primarily by studies of Holocaust memory and mediated memory,8 and 
have shared a desire to explore the “expanded field” in which memories 
cross or transcend national boundaries.9 Focusing on academic, artistic, 
literary or mass-mediated representations, such scholarship has often 
emphasized the productive moral potential of transcultural mnemonic 
engagements to undermine exclusivist and competitive understandings 
of identity and history. 
Alison Landsberg, for instance, suggested that when individuals 
attend “an experiential site such as a movie theater or museum,” they 
might acquire “prosthetic” memories “that are not naturally—ethnically, 
racially, or biologically—one’s intended inheritance.” Drawing on examples 
ranging from the American television series Roots to the film Schindler’s 
List and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, she emphasized 
that because such memories “feel real, they help condition how a person 
thinks about the world and might be instrumental in articulating an ethical 
relation to the other.”10 Jeffrey Alexander, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider 
made comparable claims about the evolution of a transnational Holocaust 
memory. Alexander argued that under the influence of widely circulated 
literary and media representations, the televised trial of Adolf Eichmann 
and the consolidation of the label “the Holocaust,” the Nazi genocide 
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of the Jews became a universal symbol of evil, such that what was “once 
experienced as traumatic only by Jewish victims” came to be construed 
as a “trauma for all humankind” and a device to “measure the evil of a 
non-Holocaust event.” As a result, memory of the Holocaust became 
“free-floating rather than situated,” creating a “universalized symbol whose 
very existence has created historically unprecedented opportunities for 
ethnic, racial, and religious justice.”11 In their analysis of the trajectories 
of Holocaust remembrance in the United States, Israel and Germany, 
Levy and Sznaider similarly argued that the Holocaust was on its way to 
becoming a “cosmopolitan memory.” They described how, in a globalizing 
world, memory of the Holocaust became “dislocated from space and time, 
resulting in its inscription into other acts of injustice and other traumatic 
national memories across the globe.”12 Like Alexander, Levy and Sznaider 
placed emphasis upon the moral potential of this dislocated Holocaust 
memory, arguing that it “harbours the possibility of transcending ethnic 
and national boundaries” and of becoming “the cultural foundation for 
global human-rights politics.” They boldly proclaimed, for example, that 
“[i]t does not take a huge leap to go from identifying with Schindler to 
taking the ensuing role of liberating Kosovo.”13 
More recently, Michael Rothberg, discussing the interrelationship 
between Holocaust memory and memories of decolonization and slavery, 
described memory as “multidirectional.” He criticized the assumption that 
different memories attached to particular groups are inevitably locked in 
a “zero-sum struggle,” competing over “scarce” mnemonic space in a 
contest with clear “winners and losers,” and instead argued that memories 
interact within a “malleable discursive space,” where they do not simply 
compete but are “subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and 
borrowing.”14 Rothberg distinguished his approach, however, by empha-
sizing that the Holocaust is not simply a “floating, universal signifier.” He 
criticized earlier scholars for “overlooking Holocaust memory’s dialogic 
interactions” with other histories, and argued that the concept of the 
Holocaust’s particularity and universality was in the first place produced 
by the ways in which it was evoked in emerging discourses surround-
ing slavery and decolonization. Nevertheless, Rothberg too emphasized 
that “solidarity … is a frequent—if not guaranteed—outcome of the 
remembrance of suffering” (though he conceded that memory’s multi-
directionality might function “in the interests of violence or exclusion”).15 
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Subsequent scholars have echoed Rothberg’s conclusions: Max Silverman, 
for instance, in his study of Francophone film and literature, characterized 
memory as “palimpsestic”—as composed of “hybrid and overlapping rather 
than separate pasts”—and shared Rothberg’s conviction that uncovering 
the “interconnecting traces” of different histories might generate “new 
solidarities across the lines of race and nation.”16
I tackle three principal questions arising from this literature. First, 
how valid is the emphasis often placed upon the productive potential of 
the transcultural sharing of memories of suffering to replace traditional 
identities and enmities with nation-transcending solidarities? Although I 
do not necessarily share the assessment of A. Dirk Moses that the “con-
stant instrumentalization of the Holocaust” invalidates a “cosmopolitan” 
approach to transcultural memory, I nevertheless address an imbalance 
in the literature by more systematically considering instances in which 
memory’s extraterritorial journeys serve to consolidate antagonisms or 
entrench hatreds, even if they simultaneously produce new transnational 
solidarities.17 Second, can theoretical models developed primarily in relation 
to the Holocaust, slavery and decolonization be sustained when applied to 
other contexts of remembrance? Whilst I do consider transcultural cross-
referencing with the Nazi genocide, my focus is on the ways in which 
Greek narrators articulate their accounts in dialogue with other traumatic 
legacies, particularly the 1915 Armenian genocide and the more contem-
porary Kurdish-Turkish conflict. Third, how do the transcultural dynamics 
of memory manifest themselves in people’s narratives, and how do they 
impact upon their understandings of the past and their own experiences? 
In answering this question, I seek to uncover “what people actually ‘do’” 
with the histories of other times and places, and how the extraterritorial 
flows of memory are internalized and reproduced in local contexts “by 
specific people with specific agendas.”18
TRANSCULTURAL CROSS-REFERENCING BY THE EXPATRIATED GREEKS  
OF TURKEY
The Ottoman millet system—under which non-Muslim communities 
were organized into separate millets or “nations”—came under increas-
ing pressure during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, due to 
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a complex interplay of a centralizing and modernizing Ottoman state, the 
rise of nationalism amongst the Empire’s constituent groups, the actions 
of international powers and a myriad of more local factors.19 The transi-
tion from this multiethnic Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey 
(founded in 1923) was accompanied by widespread conflict and bloodshed, 
and has been the source of much political and historiographical debate 
and controversy. As Ryan Gingeras has outlined, whilst Turkish nationalist 
narratives place emphasis on Turkish sacrifice and national awakening in 
response to foreign intervention and invasion—and on the persecution 
and death of Muslim civilians during the Balkan Wars, the First World 
War and the 1919–22 Greek-Turkish War—many other studies point to 
the victimization of non-Muslim minorities within Ottoman territories, 
in particular the Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks.20 Most infamous is the 
1915 Armenian genocide, but there were also other massacres and mass 
deportations, especially during the First World War and the Greek-Turkish 
War, but also, for instance, in Adana in 1909.21
At the end of the First World War, the Treaty of Sèvres was concluded 
between the victorious Allies and the defeated Ottoman Empire, which 
ceded Ottoman territory in Eastern Thrace and on the Aegean coast of 
Anatolia to Greece. In 1919 the Greek army began to occupy these areas, 
and also to push further into Anatolia, triggering the Greek-Turkish War. 
Despite early territorial gains, by 1922 the Greek campaign had stalled, 
and an emergent Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal 
routed the Greek army, forcing a full-scale retreat and culminating in the 
July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which brought the war to an end. By this 
time, a large proportion of the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox Christian 
population had been displaced, fleeing to Greece and elsewhere ahead of 
the advancing Turkish troops after the collapse of the Greek forces. In 
light of this postwar demographic chaos, the Convention Concerning the 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed in January 1923, 
envisaging a compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and 
Turkey. The defining characteristic for the exchange was religion: Muslims 
resident in Greece were to be expelled to Turkey, and Orthodox Christians 
living in Turkey were to be expelled to Greece.
At the insistence of the Greek delegation at the negotiations, the 
Greeks of Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos were exempted from this popu-
lation exchange (as were the Muslims of Western Thrace in Greece). 
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They were Orthodox Christians and primarily (though not exclusively) 
had Greek as their mother tongue, and by the time the dust from the 
exchange had settled they numbered some 110,000. During the course 
of the twentieth century, however, and particularly from around 1940 
to 1980, the Greeks of Turkey overwhelmingly left their places of birth, 
primarily due to persecution from the Turkish state. Chief among their 
grievances are the 1941 mobilization of non-Muslims into forced labor 
battalions; the 1942–44 Varlık Vergisi or “wealth tax” that disproportion-
ately targeted non-Muslims with burdensome and sometimes unpayable 
duties; the 1955 Istanbul Riots (known in Greek as the Septemvrianá) 
in which rioters attacked non-Muslim persons and property, resulting in 
widespread injury, damage, fear and even death;22 the 1964 expulsion of 
Greek citizens from Turkey;23 and a series of restrictive measures enacted 
on the island of Imbros in the 1960s and 1970s (on which, see below). 
In what follows, I collectively refer to these Greeks who left Turkey 
after 1923 as “expatriates.” Most settled in Greece, where they received 
something of a lukewarm reception, both from a government that saw 
them as abandoning historic Greek territories and from segments of the 
Greek population who viewed them with suspicion due to their Turkish 
birthplace and seemed largely unaware of the circumstances surrounding 
their emigration from Turkey. When I conducted ethnographic research 
with the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros in 2012–15, I found 
that they variably self-define as “Hellenes” and as “Romioí” (i.e. Orthodox 
Christians or, more specifically, descendants of Byzantium/the Eastern 
Roman Empire), often using the latter as a means to distinguish them-
selves from the Greeks of Greece whilst simultaneously emphasizing the 
authenticity of their own Hellenic credentials.24
Memory activists from the expatriated community have expended 
a considerable amount of time (and ink) raising awareness about their 
persecution in Turkey in order to combat the perceived domestic ambiva-
lence toward the expatriates in Greece and to familiarize European and 
international audiences with their experiences. This frequently involves not 
only the adaptation of archetypes from Greek national history but also the 
adoption of a broader frame of reference incorporating the memories of 
other minority communities in Turkey. In the mid-to-late 1970s, against 
the backdrop of the rise of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, expatriate news-
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papers based in Athens began to carry sympathetic articles discussing the 
Armenian genocide, Armenian efforts to obtain international recognition 
for its occurrence, and the armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK. 
In 1975, for instance, the monthly newspaper O Polítis—founded by 
expatriated Greeks from Istanbul in 1967—responded to Turkish press 
reports that Armenian, Greek and Kurdish diaspora groups were work-
ing cooperatively in opposition to Turkey by declaring on its front page 
that Greeks should support the efforts of these other communities. The 
author wrote favorably of the Armenians and Kurds as “ancient peoples” 
who must “be vindicated,” castigated the “Turkish chauvinists” who have 
“thought of nothing but how to exterminate the ethnic groups that they 
found on the land that they conquered by fire and sword,” and drew 
linkages between the Armenian genocide and the “persecutions of the 
Hellenes and the Kurds that have been committed for centuries by the 
Turks with disregard for morality and humanity.”25
This article appeared in the specific context of a discussion about 
intercommunal cooperation, but before long both the Armenians and 
the Kurds were making regular appearances in expatriate newspapers, 
even when the piece in question had no direct relevance to either com-
munity. In 1977, for example, O Polítis printed an article that begins by 
enumerating ancient Greek victories against the Persians, before equating 
these confrontations with a contemporary conflict between Greeks and 
Turks. Within this protracted narrative of Greek-Turkish antagonism, 
the Armenians and Kurds feature as fellow victims of Turkish aggression:
The place of the Great King [Persian Xerxes I] has been taken by the 
Turkish invader. For 500 years he has pillaged Hellenic Asia Minor 
and the Aegean. Various circumstances prevented Hellenism from 
giving the appropriate lesson to that Conqueror. By contrast [due 
to] their conflicting interests various [presumably Western] countries 
not only supported [the Turk] but also covered up the genocides 
he committed against the Hellenes, the Armenians and the Kurds, 
genocides that still cast their shame on our world today. And we arrive 
at the drama of Cyprus and the disregard by the Turkish invaders 
of all of the votes and decisions of the United Nations … Kurds, 
Armenians and Hellenes ask for justice, awaiting the liberation of 
their lands on which they have inalienable rights.26
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Cutting across huge swathes of history, the author of this article drew 
equivalences between the Persian Wars, the Greek-Turkish War, the Arme-
nian Genocide, the Kurdish-Turkish struggle and Turkish military action 
on Cyprus in 1974, casually eliding the drastically different historical 
circumstances surrounding these various moments. In a December 1990 
article, O Polítis similarly equated the genocide of non-Muslim minori-
ties in the final years of the Ottoman Empire with the persecution of the 
Greeks of Istanbul and the Kurds after 1923 in the Republic of Turkey, 
writing that “[o]ur neighboring Turkey solved the problem of minori-
ties with the Armenians through genocide from 1915 to 1923, with the 
Hellenes with another genocide from 1914 to 1922 and with repressions 
and expulsions from 1955 and later … the same genocide was also used 
against the Kurds, many millions of people.” Comparable narratives have 
appeared in the newspaper Ίmvros—established in Athens in 1971 by 
expatriates from Imbros—as in a 1983 article in which the author wrote 
of Turkish actions on Imbros:
Same formula, same execution. Lausanne [i.e. the Convention Con-
cerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations] and af-
terwards our uprooting. [The London and] Zürich [Agreements] 
and afterwards 40 percent of Cyprus under occupation. Similar of 
course applies both for the Armenians previously and the Kurds more 
recently.… Turkey found in the following decade the opportunity 
to achieve the final blow on Imbros (the events of 1964, the expro-
priations, the closure of the schools, terrorism, and much more).27
In this extract, the experiences of the Greek refugees from the Ottoman 
Empire, the Greek Cypriots, the Armenians and the Kurds are equated 
with those of the Greeks on Imbros after 1964, when Turkey closed the 
Greek minority schools (which had been belatedly opened, in accordance 
with the provisions of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, in 1951), expropri-
ated around 90 percent of the Greeks’ cultivable land and established 
open prisons on the island for serious offenders brought from the Turkish 
mainland (who committed a series of thefts, assaults and even murders).28
Comparisons with Armenian and Kurdish experience offer expatriate 
writers a means to make their own persecution more broadly recognizable 
and intelligible, and, correspondingly, the articulation of these parallel 
histories is particularly common in expatriate efforts to raise awareness 
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internationally. In 1995, a group of cooperating expatriate organizations 
representing the Greeks of Istanbul marked the fortieth anniversary of the 
Istanbul Riots by issuing a resolution in English with the aim of exposing 
Turkey “in the eyes of global opinion.” They wrote:
WE PROTEST Turkish expansionist policies, militarist practices 
and flagrant violations of international treaties regarding the basic 
human rights of minority populations as well as the ethnic cleansing 
this country is presently undertaking against minority populations 
such as the Kurds, the Armenians and the (remnants of) Greeks 
and a number of religious denominations which are denied the free 
assertion of their identity.29
In a 1994 English-language article, Ίmvros likewise published an appeal 
that incorporated both the Armenians and the Kurds alongside the Greeks:
[T]o the civilized World: the Treaty of Lausanne must be respected 
by Tur[key], RESPONSIBLE FOR TWO EXTERMINATIO[N]S 
in our century: of the Armenians in 1915, and of Greeks of Pontus 
in 1922 … now it is time for the Tur[key] to be initiated to the Civi-
lization, guarantor of the human rights. IMBROS and TENEDOS, 
CYRPUS, the KURDS—a TOUCHSTONE fo[r] the Civilized 
World to taste his civilization.30
In 1997, O Polítis similarly printed a gruesome cartoon in which a carica-
tured Turk, complete with fez and a blooded scimitar, stands at the gates 
of Europe proclaiming to be European, whilst behind him lie four severed 
heads labeled, respectively, as the Cypriots, the Kurds, the Armenians and 
the Greeks (figure 1).31 In this illustration, there is no effort to prioritize 
the suffering of the Greeks—who, lying in the background, are in fact the 
least visible of the victims—because the implication that the “true nature” 
of the Turks is hidden behind a European façade is made more arresting by 
broadening the field of victims, and subsuming Greek victimhood within 
historical atrocities more recognizable to European eyes.
In such examples, the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish-Turkish 
conflict fill in the empty background space surrounding seminal moments 
in Greek national history, thereby providing expatriate narratives with 
greater spatial breadth and temporal depth. The memories of others serve 
as tropes through which expatriate writers seek to validate, explicate and 
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communicate their own experiences and ideological stances, both to 
themselves and unfamiliar third parties, and to reassure themselves that 
they did not suffer alone but were rather victims of a diachronic Turk-
ish policy of national homogenization. By the 1990s, such transcultural 
cross-referencing had become commonplace in formal expatriate discourse, 
persistently cropping up in discussions that remained focused on Greek suf-
fering, often accompanied by little (if any) explanatory context. Expatriate 
writers were evidently confident that readers would immediately appreciate 
the relevance of bringing up these other communities, so much so that 
they were often content simply to mention them in passing by name, as 
in a Polítis article that referred to the “characteristic acquaintance of the 
Turkish race with genocide (Hellenes, Armenians, Kurds).”32 Repeatedly 
name-dropped as fellow sufferers of Turkish atrocity, the Armenians and 
Kurds became part of a regular cast of persecuted minorities totemically 
cited by expatriate writers whenever they had cause to articulate their own 
grievances with Turkey.
The connections envisaged by expatriate Greeks with the histories 
of the Armenians and the Kurds demonstrate that the Holocaust is not 
unique in offering a potential point of reference through which other 
persecuted communities might attempt to understand and represent their 
own experiences. Nevertheless, in this case at least, we are dealing with 
regional rather than global touchstones, and with the Armenian geno-
cide and the Kurdish-Turkish conflict as metonyms for Turkish atrocity 
Fig. 1. “Open the gate. I’m a European!” Cartoon by Zavikos from O Polítis, November 
1997. Courtesy of the copyright holder Ekdóseis Tsoukátou.
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rather than atrocity per se. In this sense, the examples presented above are 
somewhat different from Alexander’s and Levy/Sznaider’s description of 
the Holocaust as a global “cosmopolitan” memory, in that the symbols 
derived from Armenian and Kurdish experience still remain interconnected 
and rooted in a particular geographic context. I treat these examples as 
transcultural articulations of memory, since they involve reaching across 
significant (and, in some cases, antagonistic) cultural and national boundar-
ies, but, to varying degrees, they are also entangled histories, particularly 
in the case of the Armenians and the Ottoman Greeks, insofar as they 
unfolded largely within the common context of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkish nation building.
A perception of the Holocaust as what Alexander terms “a standard 
of evaluation for judging the evility of other threatening acts,” however, 
does sometimes incline expatriate activists to draw analogies between 
Turkish actions and the Nazi genocide.33 In June 1988, for instance, O 
Polítis wrote that Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974 “resembles 
Nazi methods, such as when Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia to liberate, 
allegedly, the Sudeten Germans,” and in a 1985 piece entitled “And Yet… 
The Nazi-esque Crimes Continue” rhetorically asked its readers “[w]hat 
differences are there between the Nazi crimes and those that have been 
committed and continue to be committed, for twenty years now, against 
the Cypriots by the Turks? Perhaps Turkey is excused, as the first teacher 
of genocide, with the extermination of the Armenians … and we must 
leave her free to commit crimes against humanity?”34 A 1992 English-
language article in Ίmvros aimed at second-generation expatriates living 
outside Greece similarly dubbed the anti-Greek policies on Imbros the 
Turks’ “final solution” for the island, whilst in a 1993 speech reprinted 
in Ίmvros one prominent member of the Imvrian Association—a commu-
nity organization based in Athens representing the expatriated Greeks of 
Imbros—declared that Turkish policy toward the Greeks of Imbros was 
so crafty that “even Hitler’s Nazi regime against the Jews would envy it.”35 
In a 2015 press release coinciding with the sixtieth anniversary of the 
Istanbul Riots, the Constantinopolitan Society—one of several Athenian 
community organizations representing the Greeks of Istanbul—likewise 
wrote that the Septemvrianá “can be compared only to the atrocities of the 
Nazis of Germany.”36 Levy and Sznaider suggested that because “Jewish 
victims can come to represent victimhood in general,” it becomes pos-
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sible for “diverse oppressed groups to recognise themselves in the role of 
the Jewish victims.”37 Equally significant, however, is that diverse groups 
can also recognize their antagonists in the role of the Nazis, and thereby 
establish the culpability and villainy of their oppressors within a widely 
intelligible narrative framework.38
The Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans—an umbrella 
organization established in Athens in 2006 by twenty-five existing expatriate 
associations (in Greece and elsewhere) with the aim of uniting and provid-
ing a common voice for the expatriate community—persistently deploys 
one particular analogy with Nazi violence: the comparison between the 
Istanbul Riots and Kristallnacht.39 The Federation organizes an annual 
international conference to mark the anniversary of 1955, aiming to raise 
awareness about the riots and identify their causes and consequences within 
a comparative perspective. The inaugural 2008 conference, for instance, 
was intended “to heighten international awareness of the mechanisms 
underlying acts of state-sponsored terrorism and ethnic cleansing as illus-
trated in the cases of Septemvriana (Istanbul, 6–7/9/1955), Kristallnacht 
(Crystal Night) (Germany, 8–9/11/1938) and other similar, but less 
well publicized, events.”40 In the conference proceedings, the Federation 
observed that the Istanbul Riots have been “described by some as the 
‘kristallnacht of Romiosyni’” (i.e. of the modern Greeks).41 In 2013 and 
2014, the Federation pursued this comparison further by advertising the 
annual conference as the “anniversary of the Kristallnacht 6–7/9/1955 
for the Hellenism of Constantinople,” and in public presentations it has 
consistently drawn attention to similarities between the two events.42 A 
2007 English-language presentation, for instance, contained a slide that 
made the following observations:
THE SIMILARITY OF THE “SEPTEMBRIANA” WITH THE 
KRISTAL NIGHT OF NAZI GERMANY
• There is a very high degree of similarity between the Kristal 
Night Riots [that] occurred against the Jewish Minority in Nazi 
Germany in 8-9/11/1938 and the Events of 6-7/9/1955 in 
Constantinople.
• The similarities are:
– The involvement of Provocation
– Action of Para-state mechanisms and use of storming troops
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– Attack to pre-marked shops and houses
– The attack to sacred Places and Cemeteries
– The orders of not massacres [i.e. instructions to rioters not 
to kill anyone].
The next slide of the presentation staged a photographic dialogue between 
Kristallnacht and the Septemvrianá, juxtaposing an image of the broken 
shop window of a Jewish business in Berlin in 1938 with one depicting 
rioters throwing merchandise from a shop into the streets of Istanbul in 
1955, and a photograph of the ruined Fasanenstrasse Synagogue in Berlin 
with one of Patriarch Athenagoras I standing in the looted Church of 
Saints Constantine and Helen in Istanbul.43
Other organizations and writers have likewise adopted Kristallnacht 
as a moniker for the Istanbul Riots: for example, Ekdóseis Tsoukátou (the 
publishers of O Polítis) released a compilation of testimonies from wit-
nesses to the Istanbul Riots in 1999 with the title Septemvrianá 1955: The 
“Kristallnacht” of the Hellenism of Constantinople; the Greek American 
academic Speros Vryonis titled a 2007 article about the riots “September 
6–7, 1955: Krystallnacht in Constantinople”; a special supplement printed 
by the Greek newspaper Kathimeriní to mark the sixtieth anniversary of 
the riots contained an article by Tassos Boulmetis (director of a well-known 
film about the Greeks of Istanbul called Polítiki Kouzína) entitled “The 
Kristallnacht of Constantinople”; and Greek bloggers have often dubbed 
the events “Greek Kristallnacht.”44 
Federation President Nikos Ouzounoglou has suggested that 
interrogating the “amazing similarity between Kristallnacht … and the 
Septemvrianá” might contribute to academic understanding of how 
state-sponsored acts of violence are organized and put into practice.45 
Perhaps more significantly, however, analogies between 1938 and 1955 
can be seen as part of the Federation’s broader efforts to demonstrate that 
the Istanbul Riots “had nothing to do with the Greek-Turkish bilateral 
relations but were related to the decline of the rule of law principles and 
democratic rights [in Turkey]” and should therefore be dealt with within 
the framework of international human rights legislation.46 By eschewing 
commonplace comparisons with events from Greek national history such 
as the Fall of Constantinople in favor of an explicitly transcultural frame 
of reference, the Federation seeks to separate the Istanbul Riots from nar-
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row association with Greek-Turkish relationships, and instead to assimilate 
the events to broader human rights discourses, hoping in this way to 
secure greater international recognition and bolster claims for restitution.47 
From this perspective, presenting the Istanbul Riots as “Kristallnacht in 
Constantinople” could be described as a process of “remediation” by 
which an older mnemonic form is “repurposed” in order to “make the 
past intelligible,” both for those who were there (insofar as it provides an 
established language and imagery through which to interpret and represent 
their experiences) and for unfamiliar external audiences (who, in the West 
at least, are more likely to be familiar with Kristallnacht, and for whom 
the comparison will likely direct an interpretation of the Septemvrianá).48
Not all expatriate commentators, however, are satisfied with such 
comparisons between Nazi anti-Semitic persecution and the experiences of 
the Greeks of Turkey. In his book Unregistered Genocide, Vasilis Kyratzo-
poulos—an outspoken Istanbul Greek and writer for the nationalist website 
Antívaro—wrote disapprovingly of the tendency for Greek and foreign 
writers to use the terms “pogrom” or “Kristallnacht” to characterize the 
Septemvrianá, arguing instead that the riots, along with other measures 
targeting the Greek minority of Turkey, should be classified as “genocide” 
as defined by the International Criminal Court and by Genocide Watch. 
He concluded with a controversial (to say the least) comparison with other 
genocides, through which he sought to argue that Turkey’s persecution of 
its Greek minority ultimately had a more severe demographic impact on 
its target population than did the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. 
Casually conflating mass extermination and expatriation, he compared 
historical and contemporary population statistics to claim that by 2005 
both the Jewish population of Europe and the Tutsi population of Rwanda 
had been more substantially “replenished” than the Greek population of 
Turkey.49 In his effort to demonstrate its severity in the face of alleged 
indifference from the European community, Kyratzopoulos thus placed 
the expatriation of the Greek minority into implicit competition with the 
genocide of the Jews and the Tutsi.
Explicit transcultural cross-referencing could also sometimes be 
found in expatriate oral testimony.50 For example, when I asked Loukas, 
born on Imbros in 1967, whether he had had any Kurdish acquaintances 
whilst living in Turkey, he replied “I have never met anyone in my life 
speaking Kurdish. They were afraid, of course. As I was afraid to speak 
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Greek in the street, so they too were afraid to speak Kurdish.” Reminisc-
ing about the Kurds who used to work in his shop in Istanbul, Spyros, 
born in Istanbul in 1930, similarly exclaimed that, “the Kurds are another 
race, they are not Turks. Now they are trying to make them into Turks … 
we also had two Armenians [in the shop], and great damage befell them 
also, the Armenians: 1.5 million.” Another informant—Gerasimos, who 
left Istanbul in 1964 as a teenager—accused the Turks of implementing 
“Hitler-esque methods” in their attempts to eradicate Kurdish ethnic 
identity, and likened Mustafa Kemal to Hitler. Nevertheless, in the case of 
my interviewees, at least, such transcultural comparisons were less preva-
lent than in the formal written discourse of expatriate memory activists.
TRANSCULTURAL CROSS-REFERENCING ON YOUTUBE
Alongside the burgeoning literature on transcultural memory, scholars 
have shown increasing interest in the relationship between memory and 
web 2.0 platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Wikipedia.51 This has 
included a growing awareness of how collective memories might be shaped 
and contested through peer-to-peer discussion in digital settings, as in the 
“comments” section of the video-sharing website YouTube, described by 
Paulo Drinot as “a crowded, very loud, and very angry debating chamber 
where everyone speaks at once, no one much listens to one another, and 
where arguments cannot be formulated without being wrapped in vitriol 
and invective.”52 In light of Landsberg’s suggestion that “mass culture 
makes particular memories more widely available, so that people who have 
no ‘natural’ claim to them might nevertheless incorporate them into their 
own archive of experience,” I sought to explore YouTube commenters’ 
uses of historical cross-referencing within this rancorous, deterritorialized 
debating chamber.53 The comments on which I focus below were primarily 
left by users self-defining as Greeks or Greek Cypriots, and where possible 
I identify users’ stated ethnicity and/or nationality based on information 
they provide in comments they have authored. Of course, this informa-
tion is user-generated, so it is not possible to verify its authenticity, and 
in many cases users simply refer to themselves as “Greek,” making it dif-
ficult to more precisely disaggregate their identity and origin.54 It should 
also be noted that the antagonistic nature of this particular forum may 
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well attract individuals who thrive in such an environment, and that the 
opinions they express are in no way representative of Greeks or Greek 
Internet users in general.
I analyzed the comments (numbering thousands) on twelve YouTube 
videos dealing with Greek-Turkish relationships.55 Despite the varied sub-
ject matter of the videos, the comments almost invariably descend into 
acrimonious clashes over the two communities’ historical interactions. 
Typically, these debates pit Greek and Turkish users offering narratives 
of harmonious Greek-Turkish coexistence against users from both sides 
propounding narratives of strife and hostility, and/or Greek “strife narra-
tors” against Turkish “strife narrators.”56 “Harmony narrators” from both 
communities revel in shared cultural and linguistic features, tell stories of 
intercommunal harmony in the Ottoman Empire and Cyprus and greet one 
another with the portmanteau kalimerhaba (a combination of the Greek 
kaliméra [good morning] and the Turkish merhaba [hello]). Meanwhile, 
Greek and Turkish strife narrators accuse one another of a litany of historical 
atrocities, berate one another with claims of racial impurity and/or sexual 
impotency and lambast harmony narrators from their own communities 
for ethnic betrayal and historical ignorance, dismissing cultural similarity 
as being the result of contamination or theft.
In articulating their narratives, these strife narrators have recourse not 
only to events from Greek national history—such as the 1919–22 Greek-
Turkish war, or the 1974 Cyprus conflict, memories to which Landsberg 
might say they make a “natural” claim57—but also scour history (and, 
frequently, the Internet) for comparisons and analogies to bolster their 
arguments. Commenting on the video “Istanbul Pogrom,” for instance, 
a Greek expatriate from Istanbul and witness to the 1955 Istanbul Riots 
responded to the suggestion by another user that Greeks have also been 
guilty of committing acts of violence by writing:
War brings out the worst in people. I don’t doubt that atrocities oc-
curred on BOTH sides during the Greco-Turkish war of 1921–22. 
Unlike the Turks however Greeks never engaged in government 
directed genocide. This is a Turkish speciality. Ask the Assyrians, 
Armenians, Kurds. The atrocities committed against the Greeks of 
Constantinople occurred during peacetime.
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Calling upon other communities to testify as witnesses to Turkish atroc-
ity, this YouTube user attempted to “prove” the veracity and severity of 
his own experiences in 1955 by suggesting parallels with other minorities 
alleged to have suffered at Turkish hands. Commenting on the video 
“Cyprus 1974,” another Greek user responded angrily to the claim by a 
Turkish user that Turkish military intervention on Cyprus was a “Peace 
Operation” (to restore order after the coup d’état by the Greek Cypriot 
paramilitary organization EOKA-B) by citing the Armenian genocide as 
a precedent for Turkish “aggression”: “Turks killed 8000 Greeks made 
200000 homeless, how is that a peace operation? Was the Armenian 
genocide a peace operation too?” On the video “Septemvrianá,” mean-
while, one Greek commenter countered the suggestion by another Greek 
user that he/she was behaving like a nationalist by analogizing with the 
contemporary Kurdish-Turkish conflict:
I want every people to create their own country and to have equal 
friendship with their neighbors. Unfortunately we have the mis-
fortune of having the most barbarous neighbor upon this earth, 
which created its state on the corpses of the Armenians, the Romioí 
[i.e. the Greeks] and the Kurds. Really what opinion do you have 
about the Kurds? Are they racists and nationalists? Are they wrong 
to demand their land?58
On occasion, some Greek users even seem to vicariously enact revenge 
on Turkey through the envisaged future actions of the Kurds. On the video 
“A Touch of Spice,” one commenter taunted a Turkish user by stating, 
“[d]o not worry PKK will fix you well. Your time will come,” whilst on 
the video “Septemvrianá” another user commemorated the victims of the 
Istanbul Riots with the epitaph, “[m]ay the souls of the murdered Greeks 
rest in Peace. Turkey will pay [for] it. Kurds will bring them the bill.” 
Whilst references to the Armenian and Assyrian genocides serve primarily 
to validate Greek claims against the Turks by offering an extension to—or 
further precedents for—Greek victimhood, linkages with the ongoing 
Kurdish-Turkish conflict additionally allow commenters to reframe his-
toric Greek suffering in a contemporary setting, providing a present-day 
visualization of the past as well as vicarious vengeance for its injustices.
It is also common for YouTube users to liken Turkish actions against 
ethnic or religious minorities to Nazi atrocities against the Jews. Respond-
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ing to a video about the Istanbul Riots, for instance, two commenters 
dubbed the events of 1955 “Turkish Kristalnacht! [sic]” and “Kristallnacht 
ala Turka,” thereby equating the Septemvrianá with the Nazi attack on the 
Jews in 1938, whilst in the comments section for the video “BEKLEDIM” 
another Greek user reacted with incredulity to calls for Greek-Turkish 
reconciliation by declaring:
We are the victims you fool!!! nazis are the turks!!! remember the 
genozid on armenians??? greeks??? the p[og]rom in konstantinop[le] 
1955??? how many greeks are left??? 1974 cyprus??? now you will 
claim the Greeks also did wrong thin[g]s…but not 1955, not the 
Armenians, not the alevit in sivas [a reference to the 1993 Sivas 
massacre of Alevi intellectuals], the[y] burned them alive in a hotel 
only because they are alevit and this [in] 1993!!! 
Shortly afterwards, the same user wrote: “Whats about the jews and the 
germans (only ten years of suffer[ing]) … with the turks 1922 1955 1974 
imia, isaak solomou etc. thrace ägais…not long time ago [I] saw pictures 
[of] behead[ed] kurds (1998) how [many] Greeks are left, armenians 
you fool…”59 Commenting on the video “Septemvrianá,” meanwhile, a 
Greek user whose father’s shop was damaged during the Istanbul Riots 
became embroiled in a lengthy debate with another Greek user who had 
responded critically to his antagonistic stance toward Turkey. In an attempt 
to justify his position, the first user sought to frame the Istanbul Riots in 
terms that he thought his sparring partner might better understand, or 
that might speak more directly to the latter’s own (inherited) memories, 
by analogizing with the Nazi occupation of Greece: “If the Germans had 
been victorious and had taken the house of your father from for example 
Crete and they had colonized it and they had killed your grandfather, 
what would you have done? Would you have gone to Crete as a tourist 
and would you have talked to me about the good Germans????”60 In such 
examples, the experiences of Armenians, Alevis, Greek Cypriots, Greeks and 
Kurds are allowed to commingle, thereby broadening the field of victims 
of Turkish actions, whilst Turkey is cast as the villain through equation 
with Nazism, an analogy that is not only internationally intelligible but 
also has particular resonance with a Greek domestic audience.
Most YouTube viewers do not post responses to the videos they 
watch, but among those who do comment the level of interaction is high.61 
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This pattern is borne out in the videos I analyzed, in which multiple 
back-and-forth exchanges between relatively small groups of interlocutors 
are commonplace. As previous studies have found, whilst these posts are 
typically characterized not by productive dialogue but by a crude “quest 
for one-upmanship,” they are nevertheless often simultaneously “struc-
tured by a desire for understanding by the readers of these comments.”62 
In other words, YouTube commenters are driven by a desire not only to 
provoke reactions and belittle their opponents but also to be perceived 
by other interlocutors and onlookers as having won the argument, lead-
ing to what Goode et al. aptly referred to as a “Monty Python-esque 
juxtaposition of substantive reasoning and extreme personal attack.”63 As 
both individual comments and the lifespan of extended dialogues tend to 
be short, there is an imperative for users to make their case in the most 
concise, compelling and immediately intelligible manner possible, leading 
to the repetition of certain tropes that are “deployed to trigger reactions 
and to capture attention.”64 This seems to encourage YouTube users to 
borrow the memories of other communities in order to maximize the 
scale of the suffering they accused others of inflicting, and to analogize 
with infamous and widely recognizable events from history such as Nazi 
genocide. Notably, users commonly draw on online sources—in particular, 
news media sites, Wikipedia and other YouTube videos—and sometimes 
assign other users “reading lists” in the form of web links, indicating that 
they have been “shopping” for or “Googling” appropriate material to 
append to their narratives.
TRANSNATIONAL NATIONALISM?
As Rothberg observed, it has often been assumed that the memories of 
different victim communities must interact competitively in a battle over 
the scarce resource of public recognition; that “[a]s I struggle to achieve 
recognition of my memories and my identity, I necessarily exclude the 
memories and identities of others.”65 If this assumption were accurate, 
we might expect the juxtaposition of different memories of atrocity in 
the examples presented above to generate a competitive hierarchy of 
suffering, what the author Daniel Mendelsohn has aptly termed the “my-
genocide-was-worse-than-your-genocide thing.”66 Competitive victimhood 
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is certainly an aspect of memory’s multidirectionality, as Rothberg himself 
made clear in a later piece of work and as Kyratzopoulos’s arguments 
(see above) vividly demonstrate.67 Generally, however, cross-referencing 
with Armenian, Assyrian, Jewish and Kurdish experience follows an anti-
hierarchical logic: Greek narrators seem more concerned with constructing 
rhetorical solidarities premised on the equality and interchangeability of 
victimhood than with establishing competitive victim stratification. This 
provides them with a means to legitimate their narratives of persecution 
by asserting that other communities had similar experiences at the hands 
of the same perpetrators, and to visualize and represent comparatively 
obscure events such as the Septemvrianá through analogy to more well-
known events familiar to European and international audiences. In this 
sense, including the memories of others in their narratives serves to bolster 
rather than undermine these narrators’ efforts to achieve recognition of 
their own memories.
The question remains, however, as to whether such transcultural 
cross-referencing simply serves to structure and buttress narratives about 
the self or whether it also had a transformative effect on Greek narrators’ 
perceptions of others. Certainly, invocations of the Armenians, Assyrians 
and Kurds were not restricted to totemic name-dropping within narratives 
of Greek suffering and sometimes found expression in impassioned proc-
lamations of empathy, angry denunciations of Turkish actions or appeals 
for readers and the Greek public to support their campaigns for recogni-
tion or liberation. In 1999, for instance, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan 
was captured by Turkish intelligence services in Kenya en route from the 
Greek embassy in Nairobi to the airport. There was a strong outpouring 
of support for the Kurdish leader in O Polítis, and in the March edition 
one writer responded to the arrest—and to rumors of Greek complicity—
by reflecting on her own prejudices toward Kurdish and other political 
refugees who had taken shelter in Greece. She recalled how, as a young 
girl, she felt that the Kurds should “stay in their own country to fight for 
their rights,” and complained that “they are dirty, they smell … they will 
give us lice,” for which she was reprimanded by her mother—an expatri-
ated Greek from Istanbul—who reminded her that “[w]e were the same 
when we first came as little children to the homeland [that is, Greece].” 
On the day of Öcalan’s arrest, the author found her mother “shedding 
tears whilst watching the news”:
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– We ended up handing him over, [my mother said], we forced him 
to leave the embassy, everything has been revealed. Poor Öcalan, 
the Turks are torturing him now.
I, however, did not believe it and I sat down … and watched the 
news, for many hours … searching to find an explanation, which would 
justify our actions. And then I saw ARO [nickname for Öcalan] the 
powerful leader of 30 million repressed people, fatigued, distressed 
and with the look of a small child who had become lost and was 
afraid. And I too began to cry. And I know that shortly, when the 
noise has died down … I too will have forgotten that look.…
There is, however, that burning that remains in the stomach and 
the guilt that weighs heavily on me. And I know that every time my 
gaze meets that Kurd, that Iranian, that Albanian and whichever re-
pressed person on this planet, I will be the first one to bow her head 
in shame. And that hurts. Good morning Kurdistan, good morning 
ARO. One thousand times sorry.68
Landsberg suggested that when we hear the testimony of another we 
“construct a memory triggered by the testimony that also is closely con-
nected to our own archive of experience.”69 Indeed, in this extract, it was 
precisely by equating the past experiences of her parents as Greeks in Turkey 
with the contemporary plight of the Kurds that the author of the article 
came to reevaluate her prejudice toward political refugees in Greece: a 
postmemory of her parents’ suffering acted as a cipher for engaging with 
the otherwise intangible suffering of others.70
There is, moreover, evidence that Greek expressions of solidarity 
toward other communities are frequently reciprocated. On YouTube, 
Armenian, Assyrian and Kurdish users often include Greeks in their own 
narratives of suffering and post messages of support on their uploads. Com-
menting on the video “19 May Pontian-Greek Genocide,” an Armenian 
user wrote “[c]ondolences on ur Genocide, Armenian communities spent 
that day with [the] Greek [ones] just like they were with us on 24 April 
[Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day],” whilst on the video “Istan-
bul Pogrom” another user left the comment, “Armenian here. Terrible 
memories from this. My grandparents barely survived the genocide.… Love 
to our Greek brothers. Thank you for taking care of us,” to which the 
(Greek) uploader of the video responded: “Never forget. With respect to 
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our Armenian brothers.” Responding to the video “Kurds Greeks Assyr-
ians Cypriots Armenians united,” one Kurdish user from South America 
similarly declared that “no matter what a map says TURKEY … belongs 
to KURDS GREEKS CYPRIOTS AND ARMENIANS.” Likewise, the 
rhetorical solidarities extended to the Armenians and Kurds by the organs 
of the expatriated Greek minority of Turkey have in the past been mir-
rored by Armenian and Kurdish diaspora organizations in Greece. On the 
seventy-eighth anniversary of the Armenian genocide, for instance, the 
Armenian National Committee of Greece wrote in their newsletter of a 
“chain of Turkish expansionist policy,” incorporating the Armenian geno-
cide, the killings of Pontic Greeks between 1916 and 1923, the burning 
of Smyrna during the Greek-Turkish War, the Istanbul Riots, the 1974 
Cyprus conflict, the Kurdish-Turkish conflict and contemporary tensions 
between Armenia and Turkey over Nagorno-Karabakh.71 In January 1997, 
the Balkan branch of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan sent words 
of support to the Constantinopolitan Society that similarly paralleled the 
experiences of the Greeks of Istanbul and the Kurds:
The peoples who were victims of Turkish Kemalist racism do not 
differ from one another. We are the children of the same land of 
Asia Minor, whatever religion and whatever language we might have. 
Victims of the same barbarity, we strongly believe that every Kurd is 
today also a Constantinopolitan of 1941–44, of 1955, of 1964.… 
The Kurdish rebel of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan 
carries in his heart the pain and the hope of the Constantinopolitan.72
In this extract, contemporary Kurdish guerrilla fighters are portrayed as 
embodying the persecuted Istanbul Greeks of the past, or as present-day 
auxiliaries for past Greek victims, carrying into their fight with Turkey not 
just their own pain but also an “affiliative postmemory” of Greek suffering 
in mid-twentieth-century Istanbul.73 
As such examples demonstrate, by the 1990s writers representing all 
three communities in Greece had become fluent in each other’s languages 
of victimhood, trading iconic dates such as 1915 and 1955 from each 
other’s mnemonic repertoires and displaying them as badges of solidar-
ity and tropes to demonstrate the universality of minority experience in 
Turkey. Such rhetorical solidarities could also be translated into real-world 
actions: in 1988, for instance, the expatriated Greeks worked collabora-
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tively with Armenian and Kurdish diaspora groups in Athens to organize 
a protest coinciding with the diplomatic visit of Turkish Prime Minister 
Turgut Özal.74 The discursive practice of paralleling Greek and Armenian 
experience with that of the Kurds, furthermore, lends some credence to 
Landsberg’s suggestion that the transcultural circulation of memories 
“might serve as the grounds for unexpected alliances across chasms of 
difference.”75 Both Armenian and Greek writers and activists have in the 
past held the Kurds accountable for participating in Ottoman-era and later 
Turkish anti-minority persecution, in particular the Armenian genocide, 
atrocities during the Greek-Turkish war, and—to a lesser degree—the 
Septemvrianá. From this perspective, incorporating the experiences of 
all three communities into a narrative of shared victimhood might help 
to promote intercommunal reconciliation by foregrounding their com-
monality as victims over their differences as antagonists.
There are, nevertheless, reasons to be cautious about the emphasis in 
recent scholarship on the capacity for the remembrance of suffering along 
transcultural lines to challenge essentialist national identities and replace 
these with nation-transcending solidarities. To begin with, the chasm of 
difference between the Armenians and the Greeks, on the one hand, and 
the Kurds, on the other, is not always so easily overcome, and historical 
enmities may simmer beneath the surface in spite of rhetorical and public 
expressions of solidarity. In an interview with me, for instance, a former 
president of the Constantinopolitan Society had the following recollec-
tions of planning meetings between the three communities for the 1988 
protest: “the representatives of the Armenians were sitting next to me, 
and the Kurds were sitting opposite.… I said to the Armenian woman, 
‘now we are all sitting down together and we are speaking in a friendly 
manner, but don’t forget that those Kurds opposite us slaughtered you, 
and others during the Septemvrianá.’”76 During YouTube debates, nar-
ratives of intercommunal solidarity between the Armenians/Assyrians/
Greeks and the Kurds are likewise frequently contested. When one Greek 
user responded to the video “19 May Pontian-Greek Genocide” by writ-
ing, “[e]ven until this day, Kurds go through the same…because they are 
Kurds, may God stand by them,” he was reprimanded by another Greek 
user in the following terms: “Do not forget that [at] those period[s] of 
time Kurds were included in the Ottoman army and Kurds killed a lot of 
Greeks since the genocide was based in religion. Of course it is wellknown 
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that today in Turkey Kurds are second-class citizens…but we can’t compare 
what Greeks had gone through with the current oppression of Kurds.” 
These examples show that narratives that cut across boundaries and 
call received historical knowledge into question may encounter resistance, 
and it cannot be assumed that the historical connections individuals draw 
in particular discursive contexts will carry over into other social situations 
and have a lasting effect on individual subjectivity. Indeed, although 
transcultural comparison seems to be fairly common in formal expatriate 
writing and (relatively) informal online debate—both contexts in which 
narrators were explicitly engaged in publicly advancing and justifying 
their representations of the past—it is comparatively uncommon in oral 
testimonies offered to me by members of the expatriated communities, 
raising a question mark over the extent to which these connections have 
been internalized by individuals and become part of their mental appara-
tus for understanding their lives. This is not to suggest that transcultural 
cross-referencing is in some sense unique to written rather than oral 
discourse, but rather that it may be most expedient, and therefore most 
common, in particular discursive contexts: namely when memory activists 
are explicitly seeking to make their narratives compelling and intelligible 
in public forums.
If the practice of transcultural cross-referencing is to a significant 
extent the domain of memory activists seeking to achieve recognition of 
their own memories, we must confront the possibility that such comparisons 
might sometimes be as much (if not more) about the subject making the 
connections as about the objects of those connections. Although in some 
contexts Greek narrators draw on perceived parallels with the experiences 
of others to call for mutual intercommunal support, or even to reevaluate 
their own preconceptions about these communities, in other cases the 
Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds appear in Greek strife narratives not so 
much as distinctive communities with distinctive identities and histories, 
but rather as truncated contextual depth for a protracted narrative of 
Greek suffering. In such cases, pace Landsberg, Greek narrators do not 
“suture [themselves] into a larger history” so much as suture compelling 
motifs onto their own history.77 This highlights certain limitations to the 
productive moral potential of multidirectional mnemonic engagements. 
First, as Silverman cautioned, there is an inherent risk of “clothing ourselves 
in others’ victimhood, which we have neither experienced nor properly 
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understood, for the purpose of identity and, consequently, participating in 
a banal culture of empathy which is often more self- than other-oriented.”78 
Second, the effort to find counterparts to Greek suffering often leads nar-
rators to disregard the historical particularities of different past occurrences. 
In order to account for “some of the more difficult and even troubling 
cases of multidirectionality,” Rothberg proposed that connections between 
different histories might be plotted along both an “axis of comparison”—
with equation at one extreme and differentiation at the other—and an 
“axis of political affect”—ranging from solidarity to competition.79 Most 
of the examples in this article could be placed in the solidarity-equation 
quadrant, as, in the process of articulating solidarities between the Arme-
nians, Assyrians, Greeks and Kurds and drawing parallels between Nazi 
persecution of the Jews and Turkish treatment of other ethnic groups, 
they tend to a greater or lesser degree to elide these different histories. 
In a 1995 Polítis article paralleling the histories of the Greeks and the 
Kurds, for instance, Istanbul Greek author Leonidas Koumakis was keen 
to emphasize that “the dramatic moments that the Kurdish people are 
currently experiencing do not differ from those that the Armenians in 
1915 or the Greeks of Asia Minor lived through,” whilst in 1999 another 
author in the same newspaper asserted that the Septemvrianá could be 
described as “a ‘photocopy’ from Pontus, Asia Minor, Erzurum with the 
Armenians” (i.e. attacks on the Greeks of Pontus/Asia Minor during 
the First World War and the Greek-Turkish War, and on Armenians in 
Erzurum during the 1894–96 Hamidian massacres).80 As Rothberg identi-
fied, although such discourses might be preferable to those governed by a 
logic of competitive victimhood, they nevertheless carry certain dangers, 
not only of distortion and misrepresentation, but also, more seriously, of 
the imposition of reified moral absolutes of good versus evil on complex 
contemporary problems and the importation of “a dangerous model of 
victimization” from one context to another.81 For instance, there is a risk 
that equating frozen or ongoing conflicts, like the division of Cyprus or 
the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, with historical atrocities like the Armenian 
genocide or the Holocaust might make the former seem intractable and 
bound for a catastrophic conclusion.
There is, moreover, ample evidence to suggest that transcultural 
connections between different violent histories might be as likely to 
strengthen as to abrogate existing national identities and frameworks of 
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remembrance. Staging Greek suffering as part of an unchanging pattern 
of Turkish behavior stretching from the Armenian genocide to the con-
temporary conflict with the Kurds only serves to fortify hostility toward 
the Turks and to consolidate the rhythms of Greek national history. 
After watching the video “Septemvrianá,” one Greek user was moved to 
write: “The Turks will never change! They did the same in Smyrna, the 
same in Constantinople, the same with the Armenians, the same in our 
Cyprus!”82 Discussing Turkey’s relationship with the EU, O Polítis similarly 
declared that the Turks “do not change tactic. Only the people and the 
victims change: Armenians, Greeks, Kurds.”83 Sharing memories of suf-
fering may thus also involve sharing abstract enmities. Similar risks apply 
to the drawing of parallels between Turkey and Nazi Germany. Though 
analogies between Kristallnacht and the Istanbul Riots represent for the 
Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans an attempt to move away 
from a narrow national perspective, discourses that liken Turkish actions to 
those of Nazi Germany are always potentially liable to reinforce negative 
nationalist perceptions of the Turkish other as a homogenous community 
of perpetrators, as illustrated by the tendency for some Greek YouTube 
users to offer sentiments along the lines of “nazis are the turks,” thereby 
equating an entire national group with a genocidal political movement. 
Although (rhetorical) solidarities may be a common product of multidi-
rectional thinking, these may often go hand-in-hand with the perpetuation 
of historical enmities in relation to a common antagonist, demonstrating 
that transcultural “entanglements” between different memories might 
“reinforce national memory communities that at first appearance they 
seem to supersede.”84
CONCLUSIONS
In a discussion of First World War poetry, Geoff Dyer argued that the 
image of war as horrific had become so clichéd that it had lost its power to 
express that horror: “War may be horrible,” he wrote, “but that should not 
distract us from acknowledging what a horrible cliché this has become.” 
Dyer termed these instinctive clichés “[o]ff-the-peg formulae [that] free 
you from thinking for yourself about what is being said,” and warned 
that “[w]henever words are bandied about automatically and easily, their 
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meaning is in the process of leaking away or evaporating.”85 In a similar 
vein, we might describe many of the references considered in this article 
to the Armenian and Assyrian genocides, the Kurdish-Turkish conflict 
and the Nazi genocide as “off-the-peg memories”: abstracted and simpli-
fied formulae, often accompanied by little historical baggage, that were 
temporarily adopted by Greek narrators, without necessarily triggering, or 
indicating, any particularly in-depth engagement with the experiences of 
the others concerned. These off-the-peg memories typically come across 
as knee-jerk reactions to particular discursive situations and often stand in 
for substantive independent thinking about Greek-Turkish relationships 
and histories of violence more generally. Just as Greek strife narrators 
on YouTube attempt to bolster antagonistic arguments during quick-
fire debates, so expatriate writers seek to establish perceived “patterns” 
of Turkish behavior by name-dropping persecuted communities and 
totemically citing decontextualized atrocities, in the process entrenching 
hostility toward the Turks and eliding distinctive historical events. At the 
same time, however, such off-the-peg memories free Greek narrators from 
thinking about history on their own. On the one hand, the construction of 
parallel histories with Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds serves to endorse 
and rationalize Greek victimhood by suggesting that other communities 
had similar experiences at the hands of the same perpetrators, and thereby 
multiplying the witnesses able to “testify” to the accused’s record of 
atrocity. On the other hand, analogizing with other, more well-known 
historical atrocities such as Nazi genocide makes these claims evocative 
and intelligible for unfamiliar audiences.
By introducing this terminology, I do not want to propose a pre-
scriptive model to classify—or evaluate—different transcultural discourses, 
nor do I intend to dismiss all such references as irrelevant, frivolous or 
disingenuous. Indeed, I have tried to draw attention to instances in which 
transcultural cross-referencing might draw diverse victim communities 
closer together, in a practical as well as a rhetorical sense, or lead narra-
tors to more reflective engagement with others’ histories and their own 
preconceived ideas. Rather, I intend to draw attention to the fact that not 
every act of cross-referencing is necessarily evidence of lasting and perva-
sive “knotting” between different histories that might radically challenge 
existing national(ist) understandings of the past, and that the discursive 
connections drawn by narrators in certain contexts will not necessarily 
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carry over into other settings and reconfigure their perceptions of past, 
self and other. Indeed, it is notable that transcultural cross-referencing 
often serves to reaffirm what Greek narrators thought they already knew 
about the Turks and to make the articulation of more differentiated rep-
resentations of the Turkish other less likely. These “off-the-peg memories” 
provide frameworks through which Greek experiences could be represented 
or communicated in particular contexts, but could likely be abandoned 
if necessary—placed “back on the peg”—without major surgery to self-
understanding or received historical knowledge. This is not to say that 
such cross-referencing has no discernible impact on Greek narratives: the 
comparisons, for instance, with the histories of the Armenians, Kurds and 
Jews envisaged by expatriate activists may well have played a significant role 
in developing the tendency to present Greek experiences in Istanbul and 
Imbros in terms of human rights discourse. What it does suggest, however, 
is that multidirectional thinking may often produce transnational transla-
tions of national(ist) narratives, or even contribute to their consolidation 
and ongoing explanatory appeal, rather than producing more reflective 
and inclusive understandings of the past.
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